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NOTES
ages could have restored the status quo so as to permit the plaintiff hIs
true and effective remedy. In this way, at least to the extent of the doctrine
of election between remedies, modern courts can and should free them-
"elves of rule from the grave.
WILLIAM TOUSLEY SMITH
Federal Liens Versus State Liens- A Problem
In Priorities
INTRODUCTION
The problem posed by any determination of the relative priority of
state and federal tax liens to the proceeds from a foreclosure sale is an
integral part of the overall conflict between the interests of the state and
federal governments. Each taxing unit attempts to obtain preference for
its claims and logical arguments based on statute, precedent and policy
are available to each contestant. State authorities argue that the opera-
tions of local government will be impaired if the federal government pre-
empts the funds upon which local government is dependent for support,'
while the federal government may point to authoritative precedent favor-
ing its demands and to the economic necessity for its assertion of its tax
liens. The controversy is further confused when antecedent mortgagees
and judgment creditors assert claims against the property under foreclo-
sure.
The courts have done little to clarify the situation and one studying
the cases will find only confusion, hedging and inconsistency.
In discussing this problem, one must first turn to the two statutes
which grant rights of priority to the federal government, and to the cases
which have construed these enactments. Section 3466 of the Revised
Statutes2 grants to the federal government a first priority against the as-
sets of an insolvent debtor. This statute does not create a lien, but rather
gives the government a statutory preference which attaches when the
property of the insolvent passes into the hands of a third person for the
benefit of creditors.a This priority covers all debts due the federal gov-
'In Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 165 Ohio St. 201 (1956),
the court itself pointed out that this was a major policy reason favoring the priority
of state tax liens.
2 Rnv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1946) states in part as follows:
'Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor m the hands of executors or administrators, is insuf-
ficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due the United States
shall first be satisfied."
'United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1804).
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ernment, thereby including within its scope taxes due the United States.4
The other statute which will be discussed is Section 6321 of the Internal
Revenue Code5 which creates a lien on all the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, but is applicable only to tax debts.
SECTION 3466
The priority created by Section 3466 was probably intended to apply
only to the unencumbered property of the insolvent debtor6 and the early
cases construing this statute held that antedating equitable liens were
superior to the priority granted the federal government.7 But m the lead-
mg case of Spokane County v. United States,8 the United States Supreme
Court promulgated what has been labeled the doctrine of the "inchoate
lien," by which the federal priority is held to defeat an antedaung state
lien which is not specific or perfected. A lien is not perfected or choate
unless (1) the identity of the lienor, (2) the property subject to the lien,
and (3) the amount of the lien are all established.9
In the Spokane County case, state taxes had been assessed prior to the
attaching of the federal priority. The court held, however, that as there
had been no distraint leveled against the taxpayer's property, the specific
property subject to the lien was not established and the lien, therefore,
had not been perfected. The court reserved the question of what its de-
termination would have been had the state lien been perfected by dis-
traint.
In New York v. Maclay,10 the claim of the state of New York was
for taxes due before the attaching of the federal preference, but neither
assessed nor liquidated until after the federal preference had attached.
Under state law, these taxes constituted a lien in the sense that they took
precedence by relation over intervening claims. The court held that the
doctrine of relation could not divest the United States of the preference
that accrued when receivers were appointed and its preference thereby
'Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926)
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321 states that "If any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person."
'Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government, 63 YALE L. J. 905
(1954).
'Brent v. Bank of Washington, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596 (1836); United States v.
Hack, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 271 (1834); Conrad v. Pacific Ins. Co., 31 U.S. (6 Pet)
262 (1832); Conard v. Nicoll, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 291 (1830); Conard v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet) 386 (1828).
8279 U.S. 80 (1929).
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
10288 U.S. 290 (1933).
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attached. Thus, the state's lien was held to be inchoate or, in the words
of the court, "merely the caveat of a more perfect lien to come.""
The case of United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.' provides
another excellent example of the Supreme Court's treatment of problems
arising under Section 3466. Virginia, by statute, gave landlords a lien
for rent due on all personal property of the tenant found on the leased
premises.' 3 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had held that a
landlord's statutory lien for rent due was fixed and specific, existing inde-
pendently of the rights of distress and attachment, which were held to be
merely methods of enforcing the lien.14 However, the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that the lien gave the landlord only a general power
over unspecified property. It was held that not until the landlord had
made the extent of his lien known and had taken some step to attach suf-
ficient property to satisfy the lien could it be possible to specify the
amount of the lien or the goods subject to the lien. Thus the fact that
the landlord had not actually asserted his lien was held to have rendered
that lien inchoate. The court also pointed out that it is a matter of
federal law as to whether a lien created by a state statute is sufficiently
specific and perfected to raise questions concerning the applicability of
the priority given the claims of the federal government by Section 3466.
In Illinots ex rel Gordon v. Campbell,'5 the Supreme Court held that
the recording of a statutory lien does not exclude property subject to the
lien from the operation of the federal priority, although under state law
the xecord of the lien constituted constructive notice to all subsequent
claimants. The state's lien was for unemployment compensation contribu-
tions and attached to all the personal property of the employer used in
his business. :6 The court held that the statutory language "all the per-
sonal property used in the business" was too comprehensive to allow
proper identification of the property subject to the lien. The lien was
therefore held to be inchoate.
The Supreme Court, by maintaining seemingly unattainable standards
of choateness has managed to avoid the question of whether Section 3466
grants the United States priority against a specific and perfected lien, thus
leaving the law in this area uncertain.
tlbui.
'9323 U.S. 353 (1945).
CODE OF VMGINIA OF 1950 § 55-227, § 55-231.
"United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn Inc., 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2c1 741
(1944).
329 U.S. 362 (1946).
' S THI-HURD ANN. ST. CH. 48, § 243 (a) (1950).
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SECTION 6321
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes two different
tests of priority for the tax lien. As against a mortgagee, pledgee, pur-
chaser or judgment creditor, the priority of the tax lien dates from the
time that notice of the lien is filed,' 7 while as against all other creditors
and lienors, the tax lien has priority from the time of its assessment.' 8
The traditional judicial approach under this section has been that of
"first in tine, first in right."' 9 But in United States v. Security Trust and
Savings Bank,20 the Supreme Court for the first time applied the doctrine
of the "inchoate lien" to a situation arising under the tax lien statute. In
the Security Trust and Savings case, a federal tax lien was recorded subse-
quent to an attachment lien, but prior to the date the attaching creditor
obtained judgment. The court held that the attachment lien was "con-
tingent or inchoate," that it was merely a lis pendens notice that a right
to perfect the lien existed.
But in United States v. City of New Britain,2 ' the court found a city
lien for real property taxes specific and choate. The lien having been
held choate, the court applied the doctrine of "first in time, first in right."
This case cannot be reconciled with those cases under Section 3466 which
have required that liens similar to that held by the City of New Britain
be completed by distraint, nor is the identity of the lienor, amount of the
lien, or property subject to the lien any better established by this lien
than by the attachment lien in the Security Trust and Savings case.
The most recent case arising under Section 6321 is United States v.
White Bear Brewing Co.2 2 in which a mechamc's lien had been recorded
for a specific amount and suit instituted prior to the assessment of the
federal taxes and recording of the tax lien. In addition, the state lien had
been reduced to judgment, the real estate sold at public auction and trans-
ferred by the purchaser to another prior to the filing by the United States
of its action to foreclose the tax lien. However, in spite of these factors,
the federal tax lien was held to take priority over the mechanic's lien. As
the decision in the White Bear case was rendered without written opinion
one cannot be sure of its doctrinal basis. But viewed in the light of the
earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, it seems probable that the state
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
tmINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322.
The classic statement of this doctrine appears in Rankm & Schatzell v. Scott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827) in which the court stated: 'The princple is be-
lieved to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim which is entitled to prior
satisfaction out of the subject it binds.
340 U.S. 47 (1950).
n347 U.S. 81 (1954).
S350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
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lien was a victim of the court's utilization of the inchoate lien doctrine.
When compared with the cty's lien in the New Brtan case, this lien
seems to possess the essential requisites necessary to render it choate, but
it must also be noted that it is no more definite as to the identity of the
lienor, amount of the lien, or property subject to the lien than was the
attachment lien in the Secutity Trust and Savings case. Placed in what
seems to be its proper context, the White Bear case belongs to the line
of decisions beginning with United States v. Spokane County and is in
contravention of the court's holding in the New Britam case.23
A further complication is added when the incumbrances to be paid
from the proceeds of a foreclosure sale include not only state taxes and
federal tax liens but also mortgage and judgment liens which antedate
the federal tax lien. The problem faced by any court dealing with such
a situation is that classic example of a distributive impasse in which A is
prior to B, B prior to C, and C prior to A.24 Where the claimants are
(A) the federal government, (B) a state government, and (C) an ante-
cedent mortgagee or judgment creditor, the respective priorities are as
follows: (1) a federal tax lien will generally be given priority over a
state tax lien; (2) state real estate taxes have priority over mortgages
and judgments; and (3) mortgage and judgment liens recorded prior to
a federal tax lien notice are given priority over the federal tax lien. 5
A recent Ohio case26 presented the exact problem outlined above, and
for the first time the Ohio Supreme Court was faced with the necessity
of seeking some solution to this problem. The court interpreted the
previously discussed cases as giving the federal tax lien priority over state
taxes, and then set forth the following formula for the distribution of the
proceeds from a foreclosure sale: (1) to the extent that the proceeds
from the sale are sufficient, a fund is to be set aside equal in amount to
the creditor liens which are given preference over the federal tax liens;
(2) from this fund, the state real estate taxes are to be paid first; (3) the
remaining amount in the fund is to be paid to the preferred lien-holders;
and (4) the balance of the proceeds are to be paid to the federal govern-
ment on its tax liens.
This decision seems as reasonable as any other that might be proposed,
yet it leaves certain problems unanswered and is likely to be subject to
some criticism.
One significant problem would be posed if the fund set aside were not
sufficient to pay the real estate taxes in full. Under Ohio law, real estate
'The dissenting opinion in the White Bear case points out the manner in which the
holding in that case contradicts the principles set forth in the New Britain case.
"White, A Problem in Priorities, 25 Ohio L. Rep. 116 (1926).
S Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 165 Ohio St. 201 (1956).
19561
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
taxes run with the land and if not paid out of the proceeds of an ordi-
nary foreclosure sale, they would continue to be a charge on the land."
Thus the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure would take subject to any
unpaid real estate taxes. However, in a tax foreclosure, any unpaid taxes
probably would be abated under the provisions of section 5721.19 of the
Ohio Revised Code.28
The principal criticism that can be leveled against this formula is that
the preferred lien holder is subject to being squeezed out in spite of the
preference given him by the federal tax lien statute. Its ultimate effect
is to subject his rights to the demands of the two competing govern-
mental units.
This derision should not be too severely criticized however, for the
court's only alternative would be to place the state tax lien at the bottom
of the distributive heap. The principal reason for the confused state of
the law in this area lies in the failure of the United States Supreme Court
to hand down clear and definitive decisions when dealing with the prob-
lem of the relative priority of state and federal liens. The Supreme Court
has time and again refused to clarify this confusing problem, choosing
rather to hide behind the doctrine of the inchoate lien. An area in need
of certainty has for three decades been confused by a consistent policy of
doctrinal deviousness.
CONCLUSION
The first step that should be taken to clarify this confused area of the
law is the elimination or negation of the doctrine of the inchoate lien.
One critic of that doctrine has pointed out that
the condemned category of the inchoate and general lien created by the
court and continually enlarged to include practically every lien coming be-
fore it, has come to embrace practically every lien to be found in the Amer-
ican law. The court has always been successful in finding the feature of
inchoateness.
The adoption by statute or judicial decision of the rule set forth in the
Bankruptcy Act, by which inchoate and statutory liens may be perfected
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, would be a logical substitution
for the inchoate lien doctrine.3
2O1io REv. CoDE 5719.01.
' Oino REv. CODE 5 721.19 in setting forth the manner of disposition of the pro-
ceeds from a tax foreclosure sale states: "If 'the amount applicable to any taxes, as-
sessments, penalties, interest, and charges is deficient, such taxes, assessments, penal-
ties, interest, and charges shall be deemed satisfied."
' Kennedy, The Relat;e Profrity of the Federal Government, 63 YALE L. J. 905
(1954).
'Bankruptcy Act § 67(b), 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952) provides that "where
liens are required to be perfected and arise but are not perfected before bankruptcy,
(December
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A second remedial step would be a strict application of the "first in
time, first in right" test for the determination of the priorities of the
various competing liens. In the New Brtain case, the Supreme Court
advocated the use of that test to determine the priority of state and fed-
eral liens, but added that "the United States is not concerned in whether
the State receives its taxes prior to mortgagees and judgment credi-
tors. '31 However, the "first in time" approach to the determination of
prionties seems to be the fairest solution, a solution which offers a meas-
ure of protection to both mortgagees and judgment creditors, whose
rights are now subject to being curtailed or divested by governmental
preferences and prionrties. This solution would certainly give effect to
the statutory preference given mortgagees and judgment creditors by Sec-
tion 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code.
An improvement in the present situation is needed, but viewed in the
light of past judicial decisions, an early clarification of this problem is
improbable.
MALCOLM C. DOUGLAS
they may nevertheless be valid if perfected within the time permitted by and in ac-
cordance with the requirements" of the law creating them.
'United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S, 81 (1954).
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